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AMENDMENT-Plaintiff, an alien Japanese, appealed from a judgment declaring an escheat of land purchased by him to the state pursuant to the
California Alien Land Law1 prohibiting aliens ineligible for citizenship from
holding land. On appeal, held, reversed. The Alien Land Law is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
"instrument for effecting racial discrimination . . . [with] no circumstances justifying classification on that basis." Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. (2d) 718, 242 P.
(2d) 617 (1952).
Despite earlier United States Supreme Court decisions2 directly upholding
the validity of the alien land laws, the California court in the principal case
followed the lead of the Oregon court in re-examining its alien land law and
finding it unconstitutional. 8 While the Supreme Court, in recent decisions on
which the principal case is based, has refused to reconsider the constitutionality
of the alien land laws as unnecessary to its decisions, the Court has apparently
undergone such a change in attitude that the earlier decisions might well be
reversed if the Court were again directly faced with the necessity of determinFOURTEENTH

11 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1944, 1945 Supp.), now rendered obsolete by
the Immigration and Nationality Act, Public Law 414, c. 477, §311 (1952).
2 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15 (1923), upholding the Washington Alien Land Law affecting all aliens who had not declared their intention of becoming
United States citizens. This, of course, included ineligible aliens. Porterfield v. Webb, 263
U.S. 225, 44 S.Ct. 21 (1923), upholding California's law affecting ineligible aliens only.
Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 44 S.Ct. 112 (1923); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 44
S.Ct. 115 (1923).
3 Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P. (2d) 569 (1949).-
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ing the validity of the alien land laws.4 By re-emphasizing the reasoning that
state alien legislation may unlawfully interfere with Congress' plenary control
over immigration and naturalization,5 the Supreme Court seems to be attempting to reserve as much alien legislation as possible to the federal government.
Instead of continuing to view a classification established by Congress in its
plenary control over immigration and naturalization "in and of itself a reasonable basis" for a state law concerning alien land ownership,6 the Supreme
Court now holds that such classification may be a violation of equal protection
when a state attempts to use it in a law concerning lawfully admitted aliens
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Two civil rights statutes passed
shortly after the Civil War, the first giving all citizens the right to own property,8 and the second giving all persons equal contract rights with white citizens
and not permitting greater punishments or penalties upon aliens,9 have been
used with increasing frequency in recent cases.10 It would seem that these
statutes alone might be enough to invalidate such laws, but so far the Supreme
Court has been content to use the statutes as merely another prop for its decisions. While the Fourteenth Amendment has long been held to guarantee to all
persons the right to engage in the common occupations,11 the Supreme Court
has recognized the continuance of the common law right of the states to preserve
their land from ownership by aliens12 and their common resources from appropriation by non-state citizens13 under the "special public interest doctrine."14 The
Takahashi case,15 however, held that despite the ownership California might
have in the fish off the coast, such ownership is inadequate to furnish the "special public interest" necessary to support the discrimination against aliens in
keeping them from a common occupation open to all others. In so holding, the
4 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269 (1948), holding invalid a statutory presumption of intent to avoid escheat where consideration for land taken in the name
of a citizen child was paid by his ineligible alien father as a denial of equal protection to
the citizen son. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138 (1948),
holding invalid a California law denying the granting of commercial fishing licenses to
ineligible aliens as a denial of equal protection.
5 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7 (1915); Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Comm., supra note 4; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941), invalidating a Pennsylvania alien registration law as superseded by a subsequent federal law, and
see especially Justice Stone's dissent at 74.
6 Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 2.
7 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., supra note 4.
s 14 Stat. L. (1866) 27, §1, 8 U.S.C. (1866) §42.
916 Stat. L. (1870) 140 at 144, §16, 8 U.S.C. (1870) §41.
lOYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886); Oyama v. California,
supra note 4; Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., supra note 4. Compare the Court's
language in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 S.Ct. 847 (1948), with that in Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521 (1926). Statute mentioned, but not used, in decision
of Hines v. Davidowitz, supra note 5.
11 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra note 10; Truax v. Raich, supra note 5.
12 Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 2.
1s Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 34 S.Ct. 281 (1914).
14 Truax v. Raich, supra note 5.
15 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., supra note 4.
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Takahashi case leaves undisturbed the finding in Patsone 11. Pennsylvania16
that a state could preserve its wild animals from unnaturalized foreign-born
residents by prohibiting their possession of rifles or shotguns, and instead relies
on Missouri 11. Holland, 17 dealing with the validity of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, to the effect that ownership is a "slender reed'' on which to base the claim
of the- state. Thus the Court seems to limit the "special public interest" doctrine
to exercises of the police power not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment18 It, therefore, might well be expected that the Supreme Court would
hold that the common law right of the state to control land ownership by aliens19
is also limited by the Fourteenth Amendment and would not he sufficient to
support the discrimination of the alien land laws in prohibiting ineligible aliens
from engaging in what might be said to he the common occupation of agriculture with the equal opportunity to own the land: 20 ". • • all persons lawfully
in this country shall abide 'in any state' on an equality of legal privileges with
all citizens under non-discriminatory laws."21 Since the Supreme Court now
requires a "compelling justi6cation [to allow] discrimination based solely on •..
country of origin,"22 it would appear that where racial discrimination is involved,
the equal protection clause is taking precedence over the more ancient state
police powers.28 The reversal of position by the California court, as evidenced
in the principal case, may well have been aided by the evidently increasing
scrutiny by the Supreme Court of all state and federal action that discriminates
against any racial group.
Sherman A. Itlaner, S.Ed.

16 Supra note 13.
11252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382 (1920).
18 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., supra note 4; concurring opinion of Justice
Murphy in Oyama v. State of California, supra note 4.
19Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 2; Truax v. Raich, supra note 5.
20 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., supra note 4; Oyama v. California, supra note
4, especially Justice Murphy's concurring opinion at 663; Terrace v. Thompson, supra note
2, at 215, 216, but see 221.
21 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., supra note 4, at 420.
22 Oyama v. State of California, supra note 4.
28 Kenji Namba v. McCourt, supra note 3; Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., supra
note 4. For the older view see Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 2.

